An Advocacy Coalition Framework to Policy Analysis: Understanding the Policy Context of Dhaka Detailed Area Plan of Bangladesh

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ABSTRACT

The advocacy coalition framework (ACF) was established to analyse complex public policy processes involving several actors. This framework has been applied to the "Detailed Area Plan (DAP)" of Bangladesh's urban development policy, in which government ministries, bureaucracy, non-governmental organizations, the business sector, and other informal organizations were major actors. This paper discusses the ACF as a viable framework for understanding the policymaking context through analysing actors. The analysis of actors under the framework broadens the focus of policy analysts on subsystem-wide patterns involving several actors who are motivated by their views, aggregate their interests into coalitions, and strive to persuade policy via the use of a variety of tools and platforms. Here is demonstrated the ACF framework to policy analysis in a scientifically debatable policy matter involving the creation of a decorated and liveable Dhaka metropolis. This article also discusses the strengths and drawbacks of conducting an ACF actor analysis, as well as recent contributions to the ACF literature.

Keywords: ACF, Public Policy, DAP, Belief, Subsystems

INTRODUCTION

A more important goal of political science, according to Edelman (1971), is not to discover the truth about what is happening in the world but to create models that may be used to predict what will happen. There is a growing sense of confidence in political models as more data points to the validity of their predictions (Almond & Powell 1966). Perceived decision-making agents, which are conceptual units used as independent components in these models, are given varying degrees of value. The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) was devised as a useful conceptual framework to describe policy evolution and stability (Smith & Sabatier 1994). This was in the

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context of the U.S. democratic system of government, in which different interest groups and government agencies compete with each other to change public policy. This contributed to the advancement of the ACF's theories regarding opposing advocacy coalitions, policy learning, and policy shifts. The ACF is a theoretical framework that tries to reduce the immense complexity of social and political systems in order to increase understanding of the numerous elements that influence a shift in policy at several dimensions (Sabatier 1999). The ACF makes it easier to analyse how policy processes change, including how learning can lead to changes in beliefs, coalition member changes, and how those changes affect policy.

Past research on the framework demonstrates that it may be applied in a variety of ways and encompass both individual and comparative case studies. The ACF has proven its utility as a transferable theory of policy change in numerous contexts, particularly in North America and Western Europe (Weible et al. 2009, Smith et al. 2014). In a study of California's water policy, for instance, Munro (1993) revealed that the ACF was an excellent way to explain the changes in subsystems over decades and the formulation process of policies. The goal of that paper was to find the usefulness of the ACF as a critical framework by looking at how stable policy-making coalitions are over time and in the face of problems with implementation. It showed how coalitions defend their core policy beliefs when there are technical disagreements by agreeing on their belief systems on the secondary aspects.

Existing literature has also shown that despite the prevalence of ACF's applications in Western democracies, a small number of applications exist in non-Western countries. Such applications in countries other than the West are a recent effort with the identification of 27 cases out of 224 total as of 2014, with Sato's (1999) study being the very first (Henry et al. 2014). In addition, a recent study by Li & Christopher (2021) has identified that there are 81 applications of ACF in China. These applications found that the ACF's assumptions about the existence and constancy of advocacy coalitions in policy subsystems, changes of belief systems, and policy change can also be used in China's authoritarian political system apart from the Western democratic context, although having some unexpected difficulties, such as some complexity and evolving traits of the policy process in China. These have also enriched the discussion about authoritarian governments, through intermingling with other policy actors, and adjusting external changes in a transitional context. Furthermore, 27 applications from 15 African countries (Osei-Kojo et al. 2022) are the most recent ones that tried to show the uses of ACF in Africa and the comparison or differences of its theoretical and methodological foci with the other global trends, particularly in terms of which themes and lessons emerge.

Even though the ACF framework has steadily been applied over the recent period

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[5]Bangladesh stands at the top in 11 of the HS 61 clothing products among selected countries. In many of the HS 61 clothing products, Bangladesh has a higher revealed comparative advantage compared to India and Vietnam (Kathuria 2018)

to analyse the policies in non-western regions, its uses in policy learning in Bangladesh have not been seen yet. This study attempts to analyze Dhaka's Detailed Area Plan (DAP) under the ACF. The purpose of this research is to lay out the theoretical underpinnings of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and show how an ACF approach to policy analysis can be put into practice using a case study of the Dhaka Detailed Area plan. The DAP's long-term policy dispute between numerous players serves as the justification for examining it using this framework. The DAP is the end product of lengthy efforts over the past few years to prepare Dhaka City's physical plan, the capital of Bangladesh. There are more than dozens of actors involved who formed three coalitions to influence the DAP formulation. The DAP under ACF implies that actors must specialize if they are to have any chance of being influential because policy-making in contemporary countries is complex, both legally and substantively. This study concludes with a review of possible users and the advantages and disadvantages of performing policy research using an ACF framework.

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THE ADVOCACY COALITION FRAMEWORK (ACF)

The ACF helps scholars understand coalition building, behavior, learning, and policy change (Weible et al. 2009, Smith et al. 2014, Sabatier 1998). It portrays the courses of making policies as a struggle in which participants create and maintain alliances, participate in learning-oriented critical debates, and promote their favourite policy issues and alternatives. The ACF framework assumes that actors can be classified into a variety of advocating coalitions comprised of people with similar moral and causal convictions who frequently work together over the period (Smith & Sabatier 1994). The belief systems consist of fundamental standards and ideals (the policy core), ideas about how resources ought to be allocated, and worldly inequities that are relevant to the policy question at hand. There is a hierarchy inside the belief systems (secondary beliefs). Advocacy coalitions compete for the incorporation of their ideas into public policy by utilizing political resource management and the facilitation of a further group called policy brokers (Smith 1990). Representatives from various political spheres, the media, academia, policy experts, and other societal interests can join coalitions (Rhodes 1988, Scholz et al. 1991, Dunleavy 1981, Heclo 1978, Jordan & Richardson 1983). A policy can change because of the actions of advocacy coalitions or because of something outside the system, like the effects of systemic events, changes in socio-economic status, the results of other subsystems, or a shift in the coalition that is in charge of the system. Besides, it is well known that institutional and procedural components influence coalition and policy broker behavior.

The ACF framework emphasizes policy-oriented learning or changing one's opinions about a certain policy, as one of the cognitive components. Policy-oriented learning can enhance one's comprehension of the context of issues that one's beliefs have found significant (Sabatier 1978). It can help one recognize and fix problems with

their belief system. The emphasis of belief systems is frequently on the search for more efficient ways of achieving fundamental ideals. While there is a dispute between two cores, all coalitions would likely stifle one another and no compromise will be reached unless external circumstances drastically alter the power dynamics of the subsystem. Disagreement should be at an intermediate level to support policy-driven learning (Argyris & Schon 1978). The ACF asserts that this learning is crucial because people of different coalitions endeavour in order to have a more comprehensive grasp of the world to achieve their political goals. To support their positions or refute those of their opponents, they typically use formal policy analyses. They will disregard information that demonstrates that their fundamental or core policy principles may be flawed or unworkable (Smith & Sabatier 1994). Basic program alterations are frequently brought about by no cognitive elements (Sabatier 1978, Smith & Sabatier 1994).

Concepts of ACF Considering DAP

Coalitions: People from various backgrounds (government and administrative personnel, interest group leaders, researchers, etc.) who hold the same beliefs make up a coalition (Sabatier I988). In the DAP formulation process, actors like environmentalists, teachers, politicians, bureaucrats, businessmen, researchers, and others form coalitions that have different beliefs and then meet to materialize their interests into policy.

Beliefs: Beliefs in ACF refer to the feeling of coalition members that call what 'should receive the highest priority (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier 1993). Actors take part in policy-making so they can put their beliefs into action. The DAP policy involves several stakeholders in the policy process. They individually belong to different beliefs. For example, the belief that the owner of real estate companies shares is different from that of the Bangladesh Institutes of Planners.

Policy Subsystem: Issue-specific networks make up subsystems. Competition between coalitions for control of subsystem policies. In the DAP policy, several coalitions compete in this environment with their resources.

Policy learning: Learning is a political process; coalitions interpret information in particular ways for their advantage. Coalitions are taught through policy implementation. Learning occurs utilizing the prism of firmly held beliefs that result in diverse coalitions' understandings of facts and actions (Sabatier & Smith 1993). For instance, environmentalists' view of Dhaka is unlikely to attract business contracts.

Policy Brokers and Sovereigns: Actors in subsystems operate as arbitrators between coalitions and as decision-makers (though policymakers may be affiliates of coalitions). In DAAP policy, researchers, NGOs, and cabinet committees play the policy broker role and the parliamentary committee approves it.

External Events: Such as socioeconomic change, an alteration in the administration, or significant decisions taken in other subsystems are examples of "external (system) events." The shift in the power of local government has a direct

effect on DAP change. Every political party wants to reflect its interest in policy formation.

METHODOLOGY

This study follows an exploratory approach to describe what is happening to the Dhaka Detailed Area Plan through the Advocacy Coalition Framework (Weible & Sabatier 2007). Epistemologically, this paper examines how the DAP has been working for a long time. Advocacy Coalition Framework best suits here to explain the Dhaka Detailed Area Plan- its actors, influencing variables, coalitions, and policy brokers. This qualitative research has been conducted by collecting data from secondary sources. For conceptualization purposes, relevant national and international research, scholarly articles, reports, plans, policies, and other resources are examined.


Figure 1: Map of Dhaka District and DAP Planning Areas

Source: World Bank, Final Report on Dhaka-Strategic Environmental Assessment.

ANALYSIS OF THE ACTORS INVOLVED IN DAP THROUGH ACF

Background of DAP: Long-debated Policy Problem in Bangladesh

One of the world's fastest-growing metropolises, the capital of Bangladesh, Dhaka, suffers from several problems, such as road traffic, water logging, a housing shortage, pollution, garbage disposal, inadequate utility services, and subpar recreational facilities. Since its start, RAJUK has undertaken numerous development projects to

address these issues. However, none of these is effective. According to S. Talukder (2019) about past DAP:

> but now it is partially serving as a reference document for land clearance and building permission. Its main objectives were not successful. It is a blown-up version of the urban area plan."(Talukder 2019)

One of Rajuk's most recent initiatives, the Detailed Area Plan (DAP) (2016-2035), is at the bottom level of the Dhaka Metropolitan Development Plan's three planning tiers (1995-2015). It was primarily a metropolitan plan that was meant to illustrate many elements of the proposed land use regulations, infrastructure, and public utilities, together with a three-dimensional representation of each local sector aspect. In 1959, the city's initial plan was created. The Dhaka Metropolitan Development Plan (DMDP), which was authorized in 1997, served as the city's development policy framework (Seraj & Tawhid 2006). The third stage of the DMDP is the continuing DAP. The policies outlined in the DMDP Structure Plan must be followed by DAP because it is the lowest tier.

The processes of the DAP preparation included the georeferencing of Mauza maps, various types of studies, stakeholder interaction, draft plan development, public hearings, and final plan preparation (Mowla 2016). However, despite all of these measures, DAP is criticized for failing due to the arbitrary deadline and unclear objectives.

1948	• East Pakistan Planning Sub-Committee
1959	• DACCA Master Plan
1981	• Dhaka Metropolitan Area Integrated Urban Development Project (DMAIUDP)
1995	• The Dhaka Structure Plan
2005	• Urban Area Plan
2010	• Detailed Area Plan
2016	• Second Detailed Area Plan

Figure 2: Chronological Evolution of DAP.

Purpose and Actors of the Detailed Area Plan(DAP)

The Structure Plan incorporates the DAP for a variety of objectives (Seraj & Tawhid 2006). The main goals are to:

      a. Throughlogical planning provides comprehensive basic service and infrastructure in the project region.
      b. Establish a welcoming environment to encourage economic activity.
      c. Enhance the drainage infrastructure and guard against development in flood flow areas.
      d. Offer pertinent planning guidelines for micro-level sustainable development.
      e. Establish service hubs to support urban development, etc.

The World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and UNDP provided funding for the DAP project, which was carried out in Dhaka by UNCHS/HABITAT. Through an international bidding process overseen by ADB, RAJUK chose a joint venture (JV) of national and foreign consultants. Saman Corporation and Han-A Urban Research Institute, both from the Republic of Korea, as well as Sheltech (Pvt.) Ltd. and Dev Con Ltd., both from Bangladesh, are JV partners. According to IAB:

> There is a clear point in the Terms of Reference for preparation of the DAP, which mentions demarcating rivers, canals, water bodies, water retention and catchment areas based on surveys done during the British and Pakistani eras and mouja maps (Tithi 2020).

The proposed treaty includes provisions for safeguarding green places (parks, open spaces with vegetation, etc.) and blue spaces (surface water bodies and waterways). However, it is essential to ensure that the biological, chemical, and geological characteristics of these locations remain in their usual state. Simply proposing an allocation of such areas is not adequate. For the population of a megacity like Dhaka to live in healthy conditions, the ecological balance must be preserved (Chowdhury 2021).

Policy Subsystem Scope and Stakeholders

The stakeholders or actors are the basis of ACF. In order to assess the effectiveness of a strategy, venue or alternatives in inducing or impeding belief and policy shift, it is necessary to identify stakeholders and their opportunities and limitations. Almost all stakeholder analysis implementations focus on the same group of issues (Crosby 1991, Brugha & Varvasovsky 2000, Susskind & Larmer 1999). Finding stakeholders can be aided by asking questions like Who are the participants that should be considered in the analysis? What are the interests and values of stakeholders? Who has authority over vital resources? Stakeholders create coalitions with whom? What methods and settings are used by stakeholders to accomplish their goals? Hierarchical bodies are involved in DAP palling and implementation (See Figure 3). But based on published articles, press reports, briefings, and round-table discussions, it is discovered that several

actors are attempting to influence the policy by creating coalitions that reflect their views on the DAP policy. They are:

1. Rajdhani Unnayan Kotripokkho (RAJUK)
2. Dhaka City Corporations (DCC)
3. Water Supply and Sewerage Authority (Wasa)
4. Water Development Board (WDB)
5. Local Government Department (LGD)
6. Ministry of Water Resource, GOB (MWR)
7. Ministerial Committee (MC)
8. Urban Development Directorate, GOB (UDD)
9. Bangladesh Poribesh Andolon (BAPA)
10. Urban Planners, Dhaka (UP)
11. Institute of Architect Bangladesh (IAB)
12. Bangladesh Institute of Planners (BIP)
13. Centre for Urban Studies (CUS) (Research Institute)
14. Real Estate and Housing Association of BD (many of them were consulting farms in DAP)
15. UNDP, World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and UNCHS/HABITAT in Dhaka.
16. Saman Corporation and Han-A Urban Research Institute, Republic of Korea, Sheltech (Pvt.) Ltd. and DevCon Ltd, Bangladesh.


Figure 3: Prime Actors in Planning DMDP Region (Source: World Bank 2007).

Though the DAP is prepared by the direct involvement of RAJUK, other actors have intervened in this policy process. The confronting situation between Dhaka City Corporations and WASA and WDB had come to us recently with the incident of water logging (Alam 2020). The two city mayors strongly argued to hand over the authority of drainage management from WASA to them. They condemn the failure of WASA to handle this task properly. Professor Adil Khan of Jahangirnagar University's urban and regional planning department criticized Dhaka WASA for its improper management of the city's water supplies. A report by Transparency International reveals that RAJUK has failed to carry out an effective policy due to malpractice and corruption (Mahmud 2007).

Other players view the DAP in light of their corresponding views. For instance, the environmental group BAPA claims that the city also has several waterways. However, throughout time, encroachments partially or filled up several canals. The filling of waterways and the destruction of a lot of channels are the primary reasons for the logging of water in the city during the monsoon season. Academics and experts claim that the DAP policy actors are not coordinated enough. Dr. Adil Mohammed Khan, general secretary of the BIP, stated:

> The concerned authorities including Rajdhani Unnayan Kartripakkha (Rajuk), the city corporations, and Environment Department must act in a coordinated manner since so far they haven't paid any heed to the betterment of the city's pollution problem (Chowdhury 2021, Dhaka Tribune 2020).

The Institute of Architects is concerned that the DAP draft's adoption will cause 70% of natural waterbodies to disappear and that this plan will substantially impede flood flow zones (Daily Star, November 25, 2020). IAB's former president Kazi Golam Nasir says:

> The draft DAP proposes a community parking system, but does not specify where and how they will arrange the land for such a parking system. So this proposition may end up with the occupying of more space on the roads by cars due to the lack of parking [in buildings]" (The Daily Star, Nov 25, 2020).

As we can see, different players in the policy process interpret this policy from different points of view. RAJUK wants the policy to be prepared according to its wish where city corporations want their wishes to be included and other actors also try to reflect their interests in the policy. Coalitions are formed with the belief differences among the multiple actors in this policy process (See Figure 4).

Relatively Stable Parameters

The criteria of the advocacy coalition framework that we would anticipate fluctuating the least over the course of nearly ten years include things like "social ideals," "constitutional structure," "distribution of natural resources," etc. These elements are also regarded as exogenous variables. According to DAP policy, the vulnerability of the service delivery system in Dhaka—a persistent issue that never goes away—is the

fundamental characteristic of the problem area. Moreover, various income levels people, from a higher class, mid-level earning, to lower and ultra-poor class live in Dhaka. The DAP is prepared considering these complicated socio-economic circumstances. There are several legal institutions to oversee and implement this policy. Many laws have been passed to regulate the institutions and define the way to materialize this policy. These factors are very constant and have a lower propensity to alter over time.


Figure 4: Graphical Explanation of the DAP by ACF.

Beliefs in the Policy Subsystem

Subsystems are networks tailored to certain problems, as was already mentioned. A "collection of actors" "who are engaged in dealing with a policy challenge" are included in the policy subsystem. In order to control the subsystem's policymaking, coalitions compete with one another. There may be many actors in each coalition. For instance, there are 14 direct actors in the DAP formulation process. They create three alliances to have an impact on the policy-making process and produce a policy that is in line with their values. Multiple actors in the DAP policy subsystem hold different beliefs. For example, the beliefs that the Mayor of City Corporations holds are different from those of bureaucrats in RAJUK. But some beliefs are changeable and some are unchangeable. The actors' religious beliefs remain unchanging, but their opinions on how to pay for, deliver, and implement policy goals, as well as how to use the data acquired to support the process, can all vary over time. In the DAP formulation, there were three coalitions.

Coalition-A: Coalition-A comprises the RAJUK, WASA, Water Development Board, Ministry of Water Resources, Real Estate Associations, and national and international contract companies. The Constitution of RAJUK exposes that it is a bureaucratic institution. The main authority of RAJUK comes from several ministries' bureaucratic positions as the contractual appointment. It is equally maintained in WASA and WDB. The top-level authorities are mostly not elected personnel but rather appointed ones. Now why am I saying that real estate associations and contract companies hold this coalition? Why do they not hold Coalition B? Real estate and contract companies do business where maximizing profit is their prime concern. As we can remember the famous saying of Karl Marx, "the bourgeoisie has torn away from the family of its sentimental veil and has reduced the family relation to a mere money relation" (Weikart 1994). They did not join Coalition B because they needed to manage public officials for business purposes. It is easier to manage appointed officials than elected representatives. If one can deal with higher officials, he could carry out his task simply in our hierarchical bureaucratic system. These companies can manage the appointed officials to grab land and water bodies for their purposive action as is evident today in Dhaka city. But it is relatively difficult to manage elected officials. Because the elected officials are held accountable more to the people than selective bureaucrats.

Coalition-B: Coalition-B consists of two city corporations, The Local Government Department of GOB, and Bangladesh Poribesh Andolon (BAPA). But the two city corporations play a prime role in this coalition. The policy conflict in the DAP

is largely interrelated with defining the executive role of policy implementation. The critics argue that the authority to prepare and implement tasks should be deployed to elected city mayors. Because they are elected representatives where RAJUK or WASA is not. The problem in Dhaka city has never been solved due to the insignificance of role defining (The Business Standard, July 2020). They trade blame with each other when the problem does not see the face of a solution. The "Operational-Action Committee to address Waterlogging in Dhaka Metropolitan" was established by the Local Government Division in May 2018. The committee's principal duties included clearing out unauthorized occupants from the current canals and drains and cleansing, digging, and re-digging them. But because there was a lack of coordination amongst the relevant agencies, these actions could not be carried out. As the city corporations in Bangladesh are part of the Local Government Department of GOB, it also speaks to give the authority of DAP to them. Bangladesh Poribesh Andolon (BAPA) also supports this argument due to their concern about the unplanned development of Dhaka city which is an intensifying threat to the environment. They also criticize the unplanned acts of RAJUK and WASA.

Coalition-C: Basically, coalition-C contains the nongovernmental research organizations and associations of engineers like BIP, IAB, CUS, and Urban Planners. From the beginning of the DAP, these organizations played a vital role in defining what should be included in this policy and what should not. They tried to draw the media's attention. Most of the proponents of these organizations opine that DAP and other policies related to urban development are needed to be reformed. They argue that affiliated institutions to DAP are full of unskilled human resources that's why the genuine problem never ends in Dhaka. They ask to appoint specialized engineers for policy formulation. BIP president Iqbal Habib says:

> RAJUK was run by planners, engineers, and architects. But RAJUK is a bureaucratic institution now. If an organization is given the responsibility to implement a plan like DAP, that's exactly what happened. In this city, it is always a complicated task to decide who will do what. No one listens to anyone. There is no coordination between anyone (Hussein 2018).

AKM Abul Kalam, an expert on urban planning, argues that an elected mayor with an expert wing can be given the responsibility to solve the existing problems of Dhaka. The association of architects draws the attention of the concerned authority to appoint skillful and expert manpower for effective DAP preparation. These organizations share a common belief system relatively.

Resources, Venues, and Policy Change

Resources in DAP policy may include various things in the policy subsystem such as the formal legal authority of the concerned institutions, public opinion of the policy, information about the policy, financial resources of actors, and also skillful leadership

of the coalitions. If sufficient financial support is not available, a policy cannot be carried out. The city mayor asks for more budget for providing better service to the city people. Many scholars and organizations question the leadership of RAJUK. Shakil Akhtar, faculty of BUET, says that the DAP should be prepared by the experts in this policy area rather it is prepared by bureaucrats from different ministries who had been appointed to RAJUK (Prothom Alo, 2022). There is little space for public opinion in the DAP formulation. Though it was opened for a public hearing after draft writing, only the media has given a few thoughts on it.

The participants in many (but not all) subsystems attempt to reduce disagreement and forge practical agreements between advocacy groups. In the DAP policy process, some of the actors play the role of policy brokers. They had mediated among the coalitions to finalize the policy draft. Particularly, the donor agencies, such as WB, ADB, UNDP, Ministerial Committee, and Urban Development Directorate have mediated to form the DAP. When the coalitions bargain to materialize their beliefs into the policy, conflict is raised. Even, to date, many development plans have not come out due to this conflict of interests among actors. The DAP preparation and implementation are related to resource control. The donor agencies mediate policy conflicts in the subsystem because they have an investment in this policy. The Ministerial Committee and the UDD are the organs of government and they need to manage and coordinate with the other related wings due to their power stability. So these institutions behave neutrally as they can bear out the minds of both sides. In the DAP policy subsystem, sovereign decision-makers include the governmental authority or the ultimate decision-maker. Generally, the parliamentary committee is the statutory decision-maker of such policies. The policy has been forming since the independence of Bangladesh. But none of them had been carried out even partially. This newly formed DAP (2016-2035) is the policy output of long-time beliefs conflict among the coalitions, more broadly among actors.

Policy Change in DAP Policy Subsystem

Through analysing coalition influence in the DAP, we can see that Coalition-A is more successful than others in influencing the policy process. Coalition-A comprises bureaucrats, public officials, and business personnel who share the same beliefs relatively. Bureaucrats are more influential in all sectors of government nowadays in Bangladesh (Rashid 2014). They have a direct relationship with all other organs of government whereby they can provide input to policy processes than others and so do in policy implementation. Consequently, the real estate, housing, and contract-related businessmen form a coalition with coalition-A a. Coalition-A has been capable of influencing sovereign decision-makers by both administrative and financial resource means. So, the first coalition succeeded in preparing the policy as they wanted. Coalition-B comprises politicians and environmentalists mostly. The city mayors have

also influenced the DAP formulation process and succeeded in controlling resource sharing, drainage and water bodies management, in this policy. Coalition-C was formed mainly by several organizations of architects and experts in urban planning. They tried to influence the DAP but could not as the previous two. They ask to appoint more expert architects and consultants for the effective implementation of the policy. But the newly formed DAP policy has not reserved any chance in this regard. Changing social and economic conditions, as well as crucial decisions made by other subsystems, can have a significant impact on an organization. The previous DAP (1995-2015) was unsuccessful due to a change in government. The BNP-led mayor worked as his party wanted whereas the AL-led mayor tried to serve his party's wish.

CONCLUSION

This article uses the DAP as an instance of a policy environment in which an ACF approach to policy research might guide an analyst. An outsider can quickly and readily tell who is on each side of a crisis, which is why the conclusions of the ACF research are commonly challenged. Using an ACF actor analysis to guide an analyst through a systematic evaluation of the actor's policy core values, coalition members, resource availability, and accessible venues accomplishes a greater amount. Since Patrick Geddes first laid out his vision for Dhaka's future in 1917, there have been several architectural designs for the city. According to this article, competing coalitions occasionally agree but often disagree on the elements of essential policy beliefs. For instance, coalitions are firmly in favour of safeguarding Dhaka's ecosystems. On the other hand, contractors and real estate firms are unconcerned with Dhaka's environmental balance.

The knowledge gained through an ACF policy analysis will be a valuable tool with many uses. Policy analysts who support or whose clients support consensus among opposing coalitions will undertake an ACF policy analysis if the goal is conflict prevention. As policy brokers or politically neutral consultants, these policy analysts will surely communicate their findings with members of both coalitions. As a result, at least two novel viewpoints on ACF research are presented in this paper. This article aimed to show the application of the ACF to policy analysis. The ACF offers useful guidelines for recommending political methods pertaining to policy change. Approaches that emphasize policy modification, actor beliefs, and coalition membership tend to ignore coalition behavior. The lack of a clear definition of coalition venues, techniques, and resources relative to actors' beliefs is a contributing factor to this neglect. In addition to providing an in-depth look at the DAP's policy subsystem, this page also goes through the many coalition forums and resources. There are expenses and restrictions associated with using the ACF as the foundation for stakeholder analysis. An effective ACF research will involve systematic

information gathering using surveys and interviews which is a somewhat expensive process. This study experienced the same outcome. However, the ACF does not offer one size fits all to solve problems. It provides insufficient insights into learning processes and how coalitions convert their views into the implemented policy (Sato 1999). The ACF is a massive framework that could easily fill an entire policy analysis textbook. Actor analysis does not take into account the institutional elements that shape coalition building and behaviour and may be addressed in Ostrom's (1990) institutional assessment and development framework (Ostrom 1990). Although they are mostly unclear and unused in the ACF's current iteration, institutional aspects are consistent with its principles. There is undoubtedly an opportunity for the notion of how institutions influence coalition actions to be developed in ACF research. The ACF should do a better job of incorporating international organizations and the effects of varied contexts into policy subsystems.

By advocating for a bigger role in actor analysis, this attempt contributes to the study and application of policy analysis. We still need to create, evaluate, and improve systematic methods for comprehending policy situations. One such strategy is an ACF actor analysis. The ACF and other public policy frameworks should be applied, tested, and improved by researchers as instruments for comprehending policy analyses.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

There has been no conflict of interest among the authors regarding the materials or authorship incorporated in this paper.

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